The week before a founder signs a letter of intent is usually the first time they see a number that reflects what someone else will actually pay. It is rarely the number they have been carrying in their head. The gap is not usually a negotiating tactic. It is a difference in how a buyer reads the same business.
A founder values the company on what it took to build: the clients won personally, the crises survived, the years of reinvested profit. A buyer values it on what will remain after the founder leaves. Those are two different exercises, and the second one sets the price.
The number is not the valuation
An indicative value is a range, not a fact. It moves with the quality of the earnings, the credibility of the forecast, the structure of the consideration and the number of buyers who can actually complete. A single offer is not a market. A competitive process with the wrong counterparties is not a market either.
We begin with a defensible valuation built from three inputs: comparable transactions, the specific synergies a strategic buyer can underwrite, and a candid view of the risks a diligence team will find. The output is a range with reasons attached. If the range disappoints, it is better to know eighteen months before a sale than two weeks before signing.
Three things buyers price that owners underprice
- Customer concentration. A contract representing 30 per cent of revenue is not worth the same as thirty contracts representing one per cent each. Buyers apply a discount that founders often treat as an insult rather than a risk premium.
- The quality of recurring revenue. Recurring does not mean contracted. A renewal rate is not a covenant. Buyers will test both, and the difference between 92 per cent and 97 per cent retention can move a multiple by a full turn.
- Management depth. If the founder is the sales team, the product roadmap and the relationship with the largest client, the buyer is purchasing a business that must be rebuilt. The price reflects the rebuild.
The earn-out is a valuation decision
Founders often treat an earn-out as a negotiating concession to be minimised. It is better understood as a second valuation: the buyer is saying it does not yet believe part of the forecast. The right response is not always to refuse. It is to price the uncertainty explicitly, define the metric precisely and make sure the founder retains the operational control needed to hit it.
A deal is not won at the headline multiple. It is won in the definitions, the covenants and the twelve months that follow completion.
Start eighteen months early
Most of the work that raises a valuation happens before a process begins. Cleaning the management accounts. Reducing concentration. Promoting a second line of leadership. Documenting the intellectual property. Deciding which customers are strategic and which are simply large.
That work is unglamorous and it is where the return is. A founder who starts early can choose the timing of a sale. A founder who starts late has the timing chosen for them.